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 Non-technical summary 
The structure of public support to corporate R&D has been rapidly changing over the last dec-
ade. Government R&D policies are increasingly oriented towards market signals and competi-
tion in order to minimise the potential distortions in the R&D decisions of firms. This led sev-
eral countries introduce tax-based R&D incentives in addition to project-specific direct subsi-
dies. A recent development in funding R&D therefore is the shift towards a higher share of 
indirect funding through tax incentives rather than direct subsidies.  
Significant tax incentives for R&D in most of the OECD member states have been introduced 
or modified within the past decades. Countries apply several forms of R&D tax incentives 
which all reduce taxes at the level of the company. First, a common form of incentive is to 
reduce the company’s taxable base by allowing extra amounts to be deducted over current 
R&D expenses from the taxable income (deduction), or by accelerated depreciation of assets. 
Second, there are tax credits which reduce the tax due and are determined based on the 
amount of R&D expenses. Third, special tax rates or even zero-tax rates are granted to firms 
under certain conditions, e.g. for young innovative corporations. A fourth form of R&D tax 
incentives is to reduce wage taxes for R&D personnel and thus reduce employment costs. 
The B-Index by Warda (2001) is a frequently used indicator that compares the different forms 
of R&D tax incentives across countries. This indicator is well accepted but it has some short-
comings when it comes to tax incentives with limitations or companies with losses or poor 
profitability of companies. In this paper, we analyse R&D tax incentives in a more detailed 
way, in a multi-period setting and under economic assumptions which reflect a more realistic 
setting. We measure the incentive’s impact on the firm’s total tax payments (effective tax 
burden) and the R&D cost by means of the simulation model European Tax Analyzer. Using 
different economic settings and model firms, we run sensitivity analyses and get by that a 
more detailed view on the effects from R&D tax incentives. 
The results show that R&D tax incentives in the EU-27 member states have a significant im-
pact on the effective corporate tax burden. Countries with highest tax subsidies are Portugal, 
Spain, and the Czech Republic. The level of tax subsidies does not depend so much on the 
kind of incentive but rather on its design. We analysed the impact of certain design parame-
ters of R&D incentives as well as the framing tax regime on the effective tax burden and on 
the resulting tax subsidy. Taking e.g. Spain and Hungary, where the granted tax incentives 
often cannot be used in the period in which expenditures have taken place, it becomes evident 
that the design of the tax incentive must be in accordance with the framing tax system in order 
to be efficient. An immediate cash refund in case tax incentives cannot be used in the respec-
tive period is found to be a good solution for this problem. The most important drivers of tax 
subsidies turned out to be the design of the incentive itself, its fitting to the general tax sys-
tem, and the firm’s profitability relative to the level of R&D expenditures.  
 Kurzzusammenfassung 
Die öffentliche Förderung von Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) der Unternehmen hat sich 
in den letzten Jahren stark verändert. Zunehmend wird darauf geachtet, die Marktverhältnisse, 
den Wettbewerb sowie die gegebene, unternehmensinterne Struktur der Forschungs- und 
Entwicklungstätigkeit möglichst wenig zu verzerren. Viele Staaten haben daher, zusätzlich zu 
direkten Beihilfen (z.B. projektbasierte Zuschüsse), steuerliche Anreize für Forschung und 
Entwicklung eingeführt. In vielen Staaten ist ein deutlich erhöhter Anteil der steuerlichen 
Förderung an der gesamten öffentlichen Förderung für FuE der Unternehmen zu erkennen. 
Die meisten OECD-Staaten haben innerhalb der letzten Jahrzehnte spezifische steuerliche An-
reize für (FuE) entwickelt. Die Anreize sind sehr unterschiedlich gestaltet. Einige Staaten er-
lauben die erhöhte Abzüge von der steuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlage, Investitionsfreibeträ-
ge oder beschleunigte Abschreibungen. Steuergutschriften auf Basis der FuE-Aufwendungen 
reduzieren direkt die Ertragsteuerbelastung. Zudem werden reduzierte Steuersätze, Steuerfrei-
stellungen oder Verminderungen der abzuführenden Lohnsteuer und Sozialabgaben (für FuE-
Personal) beobachtet. Der sogenannte B-Index von Warda (2001) wird vielfach für einen 
internationalen Vergleich der sehr verschiedenen Formen der Anreize genutzt. Allerdings 
schränken manche der stark vereinfachenden Annahmen die Aussagekraft der Ergebnisse ein. 
In dieser Arbeit werden daher steuerliche Anreize für FuE mit einer wesentlich verfeinerten 
Methode in einer mehr- statt nur einperiodigen Betrachtung und unter realistischen ökonomi-
schen Rahmenbedingungen untersucht. Es wird der Einfluss der Anreize für FuE auf die 
Steuerbelastung von Unternehmen (Effektive Durchschnittssteuerbelastung) sowie das Sub-
ventionsvolumen der steuerlichen Anreize durch Simulation mit dem am ZEW in Zusammen-
arbeit mit der Universität Mannheim entwickelten European Tax Analyzer analysiert.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die steuerlichen Anreize einen starken Einfluss auf die effektive 
Steuerbelastung der Unternehmen haben, besonders Portugal, Spanien und Tschechien bieten 
großzügige Anreize. Mittels Sensitivitätsanalysen werden auch die Effekte einzelner Designe-
lemente und den Einfluss des allgemeinen Steuersystems des jeweiligen Landes betrachtet. 
Beispielsweise können die eigentlich großzügigen Anreize Spaniens und Ungarns wegen Be-
grenzungen bzw. einer hohen Belastung durch weitere Steuern (Business tax) nicht in voller 
Höhe genutzt werden und entfalten daher nicht die zunächst zu erwartende Wirkung. In der 
Analyse schneiden jene Staaten besser ab, in denen die steuerlichen Anreize sinnvoll mit dem 
allgemeinen Steuersystem abgestimmt sind. Beispielsweise wirkt sich die Auszahlung steuer-
licher Anreize (cash refund) im Vereinigten Königreich und in Österreich vorteilhaft aus. Als 
wesentliche treibende Faktoren erscheinen daher nicht nur die Höhe der Anreize, sondern 
auch spezifische Parameter (interperiodische Verrechnung, Methode), Einbettung in das all-
gemeine Steuersystem und die Ertragslage sowie der Umfang der FuE-Tätigkeit des Unter-
nehmens als sehr wichtige Einflussfaktoren.  
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Abstract 
We analyse R&D tax incentives in a detailed way considering a multi-period setting and eco-
nomic assumptions which reflect a realistic economic environment. We measure the incen-
tive’s impact on the firm’s total tax payments and the R&D cost by means of the simulation 
model European Tax Analyzer. Using different economic settings and model firms, we run 
sensitivity analyses and get by that a more detailed view on the effects from R&D tax incen-
tives against the background of the framing tax system. We find that not so much the kind but 
rather the specific design of R&D tax incentives, the interplay with the framing tax system 
and the firm’s profitability relative to the level of R&D expenditures heavily influence the 
amount of tax subsidy for R&D. 
 
 
Keywords: R&D, Tax incentives, Corporate Tax Burden, EU 
JEL-Codes: H25, O38, O31 
 
                                                 
1  Corresponding author. Address: Centre for European Economic Research, Department of Company Taxation 
and Public Finance, L7 1, D-68161 Mannheim, +49/621/1235-191, Ernst@zew.de. Our thanks go to Christoph 
Spengel and Georg Licht for very helpful comments and discussions. We are grateful to participants of the 2007 
CONCORD conference (Sevilla) and to participants of the 2008 congress of the IIPF (Maastricht). All remaining 
errors are ours. 
1 
1 Introduction 
The structure of public support to corporate R&D has been rapidly changing over the last dec-
ade. Two major developments can be observed in a significant number of countries: On the 
one hand, public funds for basic R&D performed by universities are increasing and linked via 
additional stimuli for technology transfer (e.g. grants for collaborative R&D projects) to cor-
porate R&D activities. On the other hand, government R&D policies are increasingly oriented 
towards market signals and competition in order to minimise the potential distortions in the 
firm’s choice of R&D projects while increasing the overall level of R&D in combination with 
relatively low compliance costs.2 This led several countries introduce tax-based R&D incen-
tives in addition to direct subsidies. A growing number of countries support a significant share 
of private R&D via tax incentives. 
A recent development in funding R&D therefore is the shift towards a higher share of indirect 
funding through tax incentives rather than direct subsidies. Significant tax incentives for R&D 
in most of the OECD member states have been introduced or modified within the past two 
decades.3 Others think about introducing such incentives (Spengel et al. 2008). Countries ap-
ply several forms of R&D tax incentives which all reduce taxes at the level of the company 
such as corporate tax, business taxes, or wage taxes withheld by the employer. First, a com-
mon form of incentive is to reduce the company’s taxable base by allowing extra amounts to 
be deducted over current R&D expenses from the taxable income (deduction), or by acceler-
ated depreciation of assets. Second, there are tax credits which reduce the tax due and are de-
termined based on the amount of R&D expenses. Third, special tax rates or even zero-tax 
rates are granted to firms under certain conditions, e.g. for young innovative corporations. A 
fourth form of R&D tax incentives is to reduce wage taxes for R&D personnel and thus to re-
duce employment costs. 
As can be seen from this short enumeration of incentives, the design of R&D tax incentives is 
very diverse and it is not clear which incentive is the most effective. The B-Index by Warda 
(2001) is a frequently used indicator that compares the different forms of R&D tax incentives 
across countries. This indicator is well accepted but it has some shortcomings when it comes 
to tax incentives with limitations or companies with losses or poor profitability. In this paper, 
our objective is to analyse R&D tax incentives in a more detailed way, in a multi-period set-
ting and under economic assumptions which reflect a more realistic setting. We measure the 
                                                 
2  One of the most important arguments pro R&D tax incentives is the belief that it is neutral considering the 
structure and the choice of R&D projects, e.g. Atkinson (2007). The incentive effect should then be equal for all 
participants and projects if the policy is not to change the composition of R&D but to raise the level of R&D and 
to offer the subsidy to smaller firms as well. However there are arguments for direct subsidies as well, which are 
seen to be more likely to influence the composition of R&D, see Tassey (2007a) and Tassey (1996). Both forms 
of support for R&D are seen to be complementary. 
3  19 out of 27 examined OECD nations R&D tax incentives in place in 2005 (Warda 2006). 
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incentive’s impact on the firm’s total tax payments (effective tax burden) and the R&D cost 
by means of the simulation model European Tax Analyzer.4 Using different economic settings 
and model firms, we run sensitivity analyses and get by that a more detailed view on the ef-
fects from R&D tax incentives. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes in short the B-Index and more 
detailed our simulation model and the measurement of the impact of R&D tax incentives. In 
Section 3, we apply the model to the EU Member States. Section 4 compares our results with 
the B-Index. Section 5 concludes. 
Compared to an earlier version of this paper, there were some important modifications con-
cerning details in the calculation of R&D tax incentives. The accountability for trading losses 
and for the possibility to carry forward R&D deductions or tax credits were improved. We use 
more detailed information concerning eligible R&D expenditures, details of the tax incentive 
and the information on the ability to carry forward. The model firms have been adjusted to 
reflect the latest R&D statistics. There is now a detailed description of the European Tax Ana-
lyzer in the Annex and Romania and Bulgaria were included as additional countries in the 
survey. 
2 Measuring the Impact of R&D Tax Incentives 
2.1 The B-Index Methodology 
The most common indicator for evaluating the impact of R&D tax incentives on R&D cost is 
the B-Index (McFedridge and Warda 1983; Warda 1996 and 2001) often used in OECD stud-
ies. It measures the relative attractiveness of expenditures for R&D at a given tax jurisdiction. 
The index is based on the theoretical frameworks by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and King and 
Fullerton (1984). It is designed as a simple and easily understandable policy tool.5 The B-
Index puts the after-tax net present value of one monetary unit of expenditure for R&D and 
the after-tax income of one monetary unit into perspective. The B-Index is determined by 
ܤ ൌ
1 െ ݖݑ
1 െ ݑ
 
                                                 
4  The location of R&D rather depends on the availability of infrastructure and skilled personnel than on pure 
cost considerations. However, empirical studies suggest that tax incentives have an impact on the volume of 
R&D expenditures. Moreover, there are several results in the literature that reveal an effect of R&D tax incen-
tives on the relocation of R&D. Paff (2005) found effects that are explained by the relocation of R&D activity to 
use tax based incentives in California, Wilson (2006) found a strong effect of relocation of R&D among US-
states, Billings (2003) found a higher average growth rate of R&D for US-foreign affiliates in countries offering 
tax incentives compared to countries without incentives and Bloom and Griffith (2001) suggest that UK firms 
react to a more beneficial treatment of R&D in other countries. 
5  McKenzie (2008) provides a measure where the R&D tax treatment is embedded in the marginal effective tax 
rate and which considers at the same time the specifics of an R&D investment as opposed to a general invest-
ment.  
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while the numerator represents the net present value of one unit of R&D spending and the de-
nominator represents income after general taxation at the location.  u  is the corporate income 
tax rate;  z  reflects the specific tax treatment of R&D investments.  z  equals 1 if R&D expen-
ditures are fully deductible from the taxable base, and  B = 1.  In case of an investment in a 
fixed asset which is depreciable over time,  z < 1  and  B > 1.  If a tax incentive is in place 
which allows the deduction of a higher amount of expenditures as actually spent,  z > 1  and  
B < 1. Warda (2001) lists several amendments of the formula, particularly of the value  z,  
which account for tax credits, depreciation and allowances. 
Table 1 shows the B-Index for selected EU Member States drawn from OECD (2007). Spain, 
Portugal, and the Czech Republic are at the top of the ranking with a B-Index below 0.8. The 
Spanish B-Index of 0.609 says that the marginal R&D expenditures after taxes amount to 
60.9% of the expenditures in case of a general investment. Eight countries in the sample have 
a B-Index above 1. They either do not grant tax incentives or the tax incentives are lower than 
the negative impact of an R&D investment in fixed assets.  
Table 1: B-Index 2006/2007 in selected EU member states 
SMEs Large firms  SMEs Large firms 
Spain 0.609 0.609 Ireland 0.951 0.951 
Portugal 0.715 0.715 Poland 0.978 0.990 
Czech Republic 0.729 0.729 Finland 1.008 1.008 
France 0.811 0.811 Slovakia 1.008 1.008 
Hungary 0.838 0.838 Switzerland 1.010 1.010 
Denmark 0.839 0.839 Greece 1.011 1.011 
United Kingdom 0.894 0.904 Luxembourg 1.014 1.014 
Belgium 0.911 0.911 Sweden 1.015 1.015 
Austria 0.912 0.912 Italy 1.023 1.023 
Netherlands 0.761 0.934 Germany 1.030 1.030 
Source: OECD STI Scoreboard 2007. 
The B-Index is a useful summary measure to show the impact of R&D tax incentives on R&D 
costs in general and has numerous advantages. Its calculation is very transparent and offers, 
using some simplifying assumptions, a methodology for a fast and easy calculation of a meas-
ure to compare the generosity of R&D tax incentives across countries. However, it considers 
investment projects in isolation from the economic structure of the company itself. It does not 
account for the company’s profitability. Ceilings for incentives, tax or earnings exhaustion, 
loss reliefs and progressive tax rates are not considered either. Moreover, only corporate in-
come taxes are considered, but there are many tax incentives which are integrated in other 
taxes such as lump-sum taxes. 
2.2 Simulation Model European Tax Analyzer 
The simulation model European Tax Analyzer was developed at the ZEW and the University 
of Mannheim (Spengel 1995; Jacobs/Spengel 1996; Jacobs et al. 2005). It measures the over-
all tax burden of a model firm. The model firm is defined by an industry-specific mix of as-
sets and liabilities. Business plans include estimates on production, sale, procurement, staff, 
staff costs as well as investment, financing, and distribution habits. In addition, economic data 
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such as lending and borrowing interest rates and inflation rates are taken into account. The 
company is funded with shareholder’s equity and debt.  
For the sake of comparability of the tax burden across countries and to allow identifying tax 
drivers, it is necessary to have an identical economic “starting point”. The used model firm 
(benchmark case) therefore shows identical business data before taxes in all surveyed coun-
tries. The model firm is based on data from the Deutsche Bundesbank (2003) which contains 
averaged firm-level data over several sectors in Germany.6 For the benchmark case, we con-
sider a medium-sized manufacturing firm. It has an annual net profit of €214K, a balance-
sheet total of €6m and a turnover of €8m. The financial parameters of our model firms are 
displayed in detail in the Annex. Moreover, we use additional model firms reflecting several 
industries for the sensitivity analyses, which are as well deducted from the Bundesbank data. 
In this study, we solely refer to corporations and do not consider the tax burden on the share-
holder level or in case of partnerships.7 
We include the specific average R&D properties (R&D intensity, structure of R&D expendi-
ture) from national R&D statistics (Stifterverband 2007). In the manufacturing sector, firms 
typically invest about 4.5% of turnover p.a. in R&D. In our case, this is around €361K. R&D 
costs comprise 49% labour costs, 25% other current expenditures (such as material cost), and 
6% investments in fixed assets, such as machinery as well as 20% for R&D that is contracted 
out to external service providers. Since the firm’s turnover depends on the production plan (of 
the current and of former years), the price level and sales, the amount of R&D expenditures 
also varies over time. This might have a considerable impact on the results since several coun-
tries apply tax incentives only in case of increases of expenditures. 
The simulation model accounts for that by allowing three alternatives of implementing R&D 
expenditures: First, expenditures can be defined as a specific share of the turnover in each pe-
riod. Second, a fixed amount of expenditures can be used which is constant over the whole 
ten-year period. Third, one starting level of R&D expenditures with a specific annual growth 
rate can be implemented. The first option gives more or less randomly results, in particular in 
what concerns incremental tax incentives, because the turnover can also decrease over time. 
The second option allows the isolated analysis of volume-based tax incentives which favour 
the whole amount of R&D expenditures. The third option can be used to analyse incremental 
tax incentives. 
                                                 
6  One might receive other results in case one considers country-specific firms. In this study, however, we are 
interested in the incentive’s impact on the firm’s tax burden, seen from a more (tax) technical perspective. We 
thus abstract from all potential economic differences. 
7  The taxation of the shareholder is not considered for three reasons. First, we want to show effects of R&D tax 
incentives which are applicable by the company. Second, it would mitigate the effects found at the level of the 
company partly if we would look on the overall level including the shareholder where effects from distribution 
policy and taxation of dividends play a relevant role. Third, we want to compare our results to the B-Index which 
focuses on the level of the company as well. 
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In order to calculate post-tax profits, the tax liabilities are derived by taking into account na-
tional tax bases and applying the national tax rates. Concerning the tax bases, the most rele-
vant parameters regarding assets and liabilities as well as accounting profits and losses are 
considered. The rules for profit computation cover depreciation, inventory valuation, R&D 
costs, employee pension schemes, elimination of double taxation on foreign source income 
and loss relief. The assessment takes into account all relevant taxes, i.e. taxes on real estate, 
innovation tax, payroll taxes, business taxes, (regional) surcharges, and corporate income tax. 
The simulation model allows for statutory linear and progressive tax rate structures, as well as 
special tax rates. A more detailed description of the European Tax Analyzer is given in the 
Annex. 
The economic framework is deterministic in the sense that the development of the company 
depends on the investment program of the company which is defined in advance and which is 
not changed in the run of the simulation. From that follows that any differences between pre-
tax and post-tax data (for the computation we employ the measure of the final value before 
and after tax) in the model are caused only by taxation effects, according to the implemented 
taxation regime in the considered jurisdiction or country.  
The effective average tax burden  tb  is derived as the difference between the pre-tax final 
value  FV  and post-tax final value  FVtax  of the corporation at the end of the simulation (e.g. 
after ten periods): 
ݐܾ ൌ ܨܸ െ ܨ ௧ܸ௔௫. 
In order to measure the specific tax reducing impact of R&D incentives ∆ݐܾோ&஽, we focus on 
the increase of the final value after tax including the R&D tax incentive in perspective to the 
final value after tax excluding the tax incentive.  
∆ݐܾR&஽ ൌ FV୲ୟ୶R&஽ െ FV୲ୟ୶ 
In addition, the impact of the reduced effective tax burden in perspective to R&D costs (the 
tax subsidy) is shown. We therefore relate ∆ݐܾோ&஽ to the amount of the expenditures for R&D 
over time in prices at the end of the tenth period, denoted by T. The total amount of R&D ex-
penditures is expressed as: 
ܴܦ ൌ ∑ ܧ௧ כ்௧ୀଵ ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻ்ି௧, 
where  Et  are expenditures for R&D in the year t with t=[1,T] and where  ߩ  is the constant 
rate of price increase. 
The effective average tax reduction ߴ for one unit R&D expenditure, i.e. the tax subsidy for 
R&D, thus is: 
ߴ ൌ ∆௧௕ೃ&ವ 
ோ஽
. 
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Accounting for more details of tax incentives and for firm-specific features make our results 
only valid for the particular firm considered in the simulation. Therefore, the impact of R&D 
incentives needs to be approved in sensitivity analyses in which various industries are consid-
ered. Hence, we vary the different economic parameters of the underlying model firm so that 
they resemble the industry-specific average firms in the Bundesbank data. For analysing and 
understanding the impact of a tax incentive on a specific company’s tax level and under real-
istic economic settings in a multi-period setting, our analysis seems to be beneficial and seems 
to give relevant additional information to the B-Index. 
3 Impact of R&D Tax Incentives: Quantitative Analysis 
We apply the European Tax Analyzer to all EU member states offering specific tax incentives 
on R&D inputs and compare the results with the other member states without incentives.8 The 
following countries are considered including tax incentives for R&D: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK. We solely consider R&D tax incentives which are in gen-
eral available for all companies in order to receive a manageable analysis. Different treat-
ments according to the size are included (e.g. SME vs. large), but not incentives which are 
e.g. specifically available for young companies or companies with a strong growth rate, a cer-
tain ownership structure or companies in certain regions. We consider the situation in the year 
2006, except for the recently introduced incentive in Italy in 2007.  
3.1 Corporate Income Tax Burden 
3.1.1 Comparison without Incentive 
In a first step, we determine the effective average tax burden of our model firm (benchmark) 
for the manufacturing industry in 27 EU Member States without considering R&D tax incen-
tives. Table 2 presents the results in the second and third column.9 Estonia is ranked top with 
the lowest effective tax burden of €647K. It is closely followed by Ireland and Bulgaria. 
Companies in France face by far the highest effective tax burden of €2,359K which is more 
than 360% of the tax burden in Estonia. The second highest tax burden arises in Germany 
with €1,874K. 
The effective tax burden is heavily driven by the corporate income tax rate. It is 12% and 10% 
respectively in Ireland and Bulgaria. It amounts to 23% in Estonia – but is solely levied on 
distributed profit, i.e. only on a rather small part of annual income. In France, the corporate 
tax rate is 33.33%. In addition, there are several surcharges levied on the corporate taxable 
income plus a considerable non-profit tax. In Germany, the result is driven by a comparably 
                                                 
8  Incentives which are available irrespective of R&D like general investment credits are not included. 
9  Countries are ranked according to the effective tax burden after accounting for incentives (column 5). 
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high combined statutory tax rate of 38.3% (corporate and local business tax) plus a non-profit 
related taxation as part of local business tax.10 
3.1.2 Tax Incentives 
In a second step, we consider specific R&D tax incentives on R&D inputs in the tax assess-
ment for the above mentioned 16 countries with incentives in place and compare it with the 
no-incentive situation, i.e. with  ∆ݐܾோ&஽. 
As can be seen from column 5 in Table 2, the Czech Republic is the most attractive location 
in case R&D incentives are claimed. Without the incentive, it falls back on 10th position (see 
also column 7 in brackets which indicates the won or lost positions in the ranking due to in-
centives). The model firm faces a tax burden of €1,122K in the Czech Republic after ten 
simulation periods without accounting for the incentive. The incentive reduces the tax burden 
substantially by €729K so that the firm ends up with a tax burden of only €393K. Recall, that 
the R&D cost is around €360K p.a. or €3.6m after the ten year period. 
In the ranking with tax incentives, the Czech Republic is followed by Portugal which is char-
acterised by an even more pronounced decrease of the tax burden compared to the case when 
there is no incentive (€845K). These two countries obviously offer very generous incentives 
which trigger a strong reduction in the tax burden. What about the other 14 countries with 
R&D tax incentives? As can be seen from the table, the decrease of the tax burden (column 6) 
differs enormously. It amounts to more than €800K in Spain and to around €500K in Malta 
and Hungary. But there are also minor effects as in Poland, Greece, Ireland, and Belgium with 
less than a €100K reduction. Most countries with incentives, can improve their ranking for at 
least one position. However, France remains at the bottom of the ranking. Moreover, the span 
of tax burdens decreases. The span before accounting for incentives is €1,892K. It is €1,708K 
in case of incentives. 
Table 2: Effective Tax Burden in EU Member States and Impact of Tax Incentives on Firm Value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Country Tax burden  (€1,000) 
Ranking 
without in-
centive 
R&D  
tax incentive
Tax Burden
incl. R&D
incentive 
(€1,000) 
Decrease of 
tax burden 
Ranking  
[delta] 
Czech Republik  1,122 10 yes 393 729 1 [9] 
Portugal  1,285 13 yes 440 845 2 [11] 
Ireland  684 2 yes 608 76 3 [-1] 
Estonia  647 1 - 647 - 4 [-3] 
Bulgaria  696 3 - 696 - 5 [-2] 
Latvia  799 4 - 799 - 6 [-2] 
United Kingdom  1,179 11 yes 817 362 7 [4] 
Romania  848 5 - 848 - 8 [-3] 
Slovakia  928 6 - 928 - 9 [-3] 
                                                 
10  For more details on the tax drivers in case of general taxation see Jacobs and Spengel (1996), and Jacobs et 
al. (2005). 
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Poland  959 7 yes 929 30 10 [-3] 
Hungary  1,433 18 yes 963 470 11 [7] 
Netherlands  1,398 16 yes 966 432 12 [4] 
Cyprus  970 8 - 970 - 13 [-5] 
Spain  1,801 25 yes 995 806 14 [11] 
Lithuania  999 9 - 999 - 15 [-6] 
Malta  1,616 22 yes 1,103 513 16 [6] 
Slovenia  1,457 20 yes 1,256 201 17 [3] 
Finland  1,267 12 yes 1,267 0 18 [-6] 
Greece  1,334 15 yes 1,282 52 19 [-4] 
Sweden  1,324 14 - 1,324 - 20 [-6] 
Italy  1,730 24 yes 1,371 359 21 [3] 
Luxembourg  1,410 17 - 1,410 - 22 [-5] 
Austria  1,742 23 yes 1,422 320 23 [0] 
Denmark  1,453 19 - 1,453 - 24 [-5] 
Belgium  1,585 21 yes 1,526 59 25 [-4] 
Germany  1,874 26 - 1,874 - 26 [0] 
France  2,539 27 yes 2,101 438 27 [0] 
The resulting relief through an R&D tax incentive depends heavily on the incentive’s design. 
So what are the drivers behind these reductions? In order to analyse this, the countries are 
grouped according to the applied incentives. An overview of analysed R&D incentives is 
given in the Annex. 
Tax credits 
Tax credits for R&D expenditures are granted in Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, and Spain. They differ according whether they can be applied on the whole 
R&D expenditures (volume-based) or only on the increase in expenditures (incremental). The 
strongest decline for the tax burden with €845K for the benchmark case is achieved by Portu-
gal. Its tax credit reduces the tax due by 20% on the volume and by additional 50% on the in-
crement of R&D expenditures compared to the expenditures 2 years before (rolling base). If 
the tax due is not sufficient to take use of the whole tax credit, the credit can be carried for-
ward in the following 6 years. Spain implemented a tax credit of 30% on the volume and 50% 
on the increase of current expenditures, 20% on the costs for certain personnel and 10% on 
capital expenditures for R&D and is second for the reduction of the tax burden. There is how-
ever an overall limit at 50% of the corporate tax in the specific year. The exceeding amount 
qualifies to be carried forward. Austria, France, Italy, and the Netherlands still have reduc-
tions in the tax burden of between €320K and €438K. 
In contrast to these countries with a significant decrease of the tax burden, the decrease is 
moderate for firms in Ireland. The reason for this is primarily that Ireland applies only an in-
cremental tax credit.11  
                                                 
11  R&D expenditures in this simulation are not fixed (see Section 2.2), they increase moderately at rate 1.9% on 
average. So the impact of the tax incentive is not very pronounced. A more detailed analysis on the impact of 
incremental tax incentives is given in the sensitivity analysis. 
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The impact of tax credits in general does not depend on the corporate tax rate. It is mostly 
driven by the tax credit’s volume and the amount of favoured expenditures. Portugal and 
Spain grant credits of 70% (20%+50%) and 80% (30%+50%), the Austrian tax credit is only 
8%. An influence, though, of the corporate tax rate is given insofar as the resulting reduction 
in the corporate tax due remains in the company and itself generates financial returns for the 
company. A lower corporate tax rate therefore slightly increases the value of the tax credit 
and a higher corporate tax rate decreases the beneficial impact of a tax credit.  
Reductions of the Taxable Base 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom 
apply tax incentives in the form of extra-deductions from the taxable base that exceed the ac-
tually realised expenditures. They are mostly based on current expenditures; Belgium and Po-
land allow the incentive for investments in fixed assets only. 
The Czech Republic has the third highest decrease in tax burden with €729K due to its extra 
deduction of 100% from the corporate tax base for current expenditures and certain capital 
R&D expenditures. There is an option to carry forward unused deductions up to 3 years if the 
tax base of the period is not sufficient to cover the deduction. Malta is the second country 
with a strong decline of the effective tax burden due to the extra deduction of 50% on the vol-
ume of expenditures for R&D. Hungary offers a generous extra deduction of 100% (at the 
same level as the Czech Republic) and achieves a significant but less strong reduction as the 
Czech Republic or Malta.  
The tax incentive in Poland consists of a 50% extra deduction12 on the volume of capital ex-
penditures for investments in goods which represent “New Technology” and decreases the tax 
burden only by a very small amount (€30K) as the qualifying R&D expenditures in our simu-
lation are fairly low. For Greece granting a 50% tax incentive on the increase of R&D expen-
ditures the impact is moderate as well. 
The relief induced by an extra deduction for R&D depends on its volume, on the volume and 
kind of eligible R&D expenditures and on the framing corporate tax system, in particular the 
applicable corporate tax rate. A higher tax rate results in a higher reduction of the tax burden, 
as can be seen for the Czech Republic and Hungary which both grant an extra deduction of 
100% on current expenditures, but have different corporate tax rates of 24% and 16%. Ac-
cordingly, the absolute relief for the Czech Republic is more distinct compared to the Hungar-
ian incentive. The UK applies a progressive corporate tax rate. Consequently, we find that the 
extra deduction causes progression effects in that way that smaller firms with lower tax rates 
receive lower reductions as large firms. In our case however, the reduction is moderate with 
€362K. 
                                                 
12  Besides that, Poland grants incentives for R&D centers which, however, are not considered here. 
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Tax Deferral 
Belgium, Finland, Greece, and the United Kingdom grant accelerated depreciation for certain 
investments in fixed assets used for R&D. As can be seen from Finland, where the accelerated 
depreciation is the only incentive granted, the effect is too small to arise in the results. This is 
not surprising since accelerated depreciation incentives only lead to timing effects insofar as 
taxes are payable deferred in time. Similar is true for accelerated depreciation in Greece 
(equipment and buildings), Poland (New Technology) and Belgium (plant and equipment). 
The effect is slightly stronger for the full depreciation for R&D equipment in the UK with an 
isolated reduction of nearly €2K. 
Reduction of Costs for Personnel 
Belgium and the Netherlands apply a special form of R&D tax incentive. They reduce the 
costs for R&D personnel by reducing the income tax on the wages of these researchers with-
held by the company. Thus the company does only have to pay a certain percentage of the 
withheld income tax to the fiscal authorities and can keep the rest. This results in a relief 
which is quite independent from the profitability or the corporate tax burden of the firm. The 
tax incentive is more generous in the Netherlands, especially for SME companies, as the tax 
relief decreases with personnel expenditures. The effect is significant with €432K. Belgium 
offers its credit for highly qualified personnel or personnel which is working in projects with 
certain public institutions. Beside accelerated depreciation and extra deduction for capital ex-
penditures, the effect is €59K. 
3.1.3 Definition of Favoured R&D Expenditures 
The definition of R&D expenditures which fall under the tax incentive is crucial for the 
amount of tax reduction. Although most countries use the Frascati definition (OECD 2002) as 
a starting point, some countries are quite restrictive and accept only certain R&D activities or 
kinds of expenditures. The Netherlands and Belgium, e.g., focus on expenditures for R&D 
personnel. In addition, there are countries like Spain which have a broader understanding of 
eligible activities (e.g. design, technological innovation).13 Countries with a wide scope for the 
kind of eligible expenditures within the Frascati definition are for example Austria, France, 
Portugal and Spain as they include capital expenditures beside current expenditures and they 
do include (up to certain limits) expenditures for contracting out R&D activities. These coun-
tries in tendency show higher tax reductions as is shown in the results. 
                                                 
13  The latter point is not considered in the simulations, where we included expenditures based on the Frascati 
definition of R&D. 
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3.1.4 Losses and Low Profitability 
All tax incentives reduce the tax due of the respective period. However, in periods with losses 
or in periods where the profitability of the company is low, the incentives either create or in-
crease losses (in case of allowances or tax deferral) or cannot be used (in case of tax credits) 
since there is no tax payment which they could reduce. 
It then depends if the exceeding incentive is allowed to be carried forward in order to be used 
in future periods with higher profits. And, if there is any possibility for carrying forward, if 
the allowed time horizon is long enough to reach periods with a higher corporate taxable base 
or if the potential deduction is lost. Most countries link the possibility for carry forward to the 
general rules for loss carry forward. Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, how-
ever, give immediate cash refund in order to increase the firm’s liquidity. Italy does not allow 
for any carry forward of the incentives. We do not observe losses for our benchmark firm as 
the firm itself is profitable in all observed periods, but we find periods where not all tax cred-
its (e.g. Spain, France) or tax deductions (e.g. Hungary) are useable in the respective period 
and are thus carried forward. This is especially true for those countries which offer a generous 
tax incentive in combination with firms with a low profitability. We discuss that point later in 
the sensitivity analysis (please see 3.2.1.). 
3.1.5 Impact of Other Taxes 
Other taxes levied on the firm level, such as real estate tax, business tax, payroll tax, and their 
interaction with the granted R&D incentives play an important role in the incentive’s impact 
on total tax burden. Most taxes are deductible from the corporate taxable base. In conse-
quence, these taxes lower the corporate tax base and the probability to use the full R&D tax 
credit or extra deduction and thus might have a negative impact on the incentive’s efficiency. 
Figure 1 displays the share of non-corporate taxes of total tax burden (calculated without ac-
counting for R&D tax incentives). 
The total tax burden in Cyprus, Hungary, France, Germany, and Austria contains other taxes 
to more than 30%. In case of the countries with an incentive the impact can be clearly seen, 
the incentives compete for tax base or corporate tax due with other taxes (see Section 3.2.1. 
for a more detailed analysis across different industries). Thus the probability that the incentive 
can be used in full in the respective year is lower for those countries with a higher share of 
other taxes. Hungary has a business tax which is deductible two times from the corporate tax 
base leaving a small amount of tax base for the R&D extra deduction. We find a similar but 
smaller effect for France. We find no effect of other taxes for Malta, which has only corporate 
income tax and a share of other taxes of zero. The incentive of 50% extra deduction there can 
be used in full in all periods as the corporate tax base is high enough and not reduced through 
the deduction of other taxes. The effect in Czech Republic is small as well, as only real estate 
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tax reduces the corporate tax base being another important influence for the different impact 
of the quite similar extra deduction of 100% in Hungary and Czech Republic. 
Figure 1: share of corporate tax and other taxes on the effective tax burden of the benchmark model firm. 
 
3.2 Sensitivity Analyses 
3.2.1 Comparison of Industries 
In the next step we run sensitivity analyses and consider the tax burden in case of selected in-
dustries: chemical, electric, food, mechanical engineering, metal, and motor vehicle. For this 
purpose, the underlying firm specific parameters in the simulation model are changed. While 
all other economic parameters like the specific national tax regimes or the parameters for the 
different kinds of R&D expenditures remain the same, the model firms have different eco-
nomic structures and financial ratios. The level of R&D intensity of each of the model firms 
reflects the average level of the respective industry.  
The results are presented in Table 3 by means of the tax subsidy per monetary unit of R&D 
expenditure. The second column shows the tax subsidies of the already considered firm in the 
manufacturing sector (benchmark). The tax subsidy amounts to 21.1% in Portugal, i.e. €1 of 
R&D expenditure is subsidised with €0.211 in addition to general treatment of expenditures. 
The tax subsidy is close to zero in Finland and only 0.8% in Poland. 
Comparing the industries, there is some variation in the tax subsidies. The Portuguese tax 
subsidy is 21.7% in the mechanical industry, but only 17.2% in the motor vehicle industry and 
18.0% in the electric industry. The impact of the Spanish incentives even is between 30.5% 
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for metal and 14.5% for motor vehicle. In the Czech Republic, the tax subsidy is between 
18.5% for food and 15.0% for motor vehicle. If we focus on Malta, the impact looks much 
more stable compared to the top three countries ranging from 12.6% to 12.8%. The impact for 
the countries at the lower end of the ranking is much more stable as well, the standard devia-
tion being close to zero. The inter-country effects are high enough to change even the ranking 
for some model firms, e.g. Portugal and Spain change places for metal, chemicals and food. 
The same is true for Hungary and Malta concerning chemicals, food, and metal. 
Table 3: Tax subsidy per unit R&D expenditure in % per industry 
Country 
Bench-
mark 
firm 
Chemi-
cals Electric Food 
Mech. 
enginee-
ring 
Metal Motor vehicle 
Mean 
(6 ind.) 
Std. 
dev. 
Portugal 21.1 21.1 18.0 21.3 21.7 21.5 17.2 20.3 1.9 
Spain 20.1 22.3 16.4 30.4 21.7 30.5 14.5 22.3 6.2 
Czech Republik 18.2 18.5 16.0 18.5 18.4 18.5 15.0 17.6 1.4 
Malta 12.8 12.8 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.6 12.7 0.1 
Hungary 11.7 14.0 9.7 28.6 12.5 25.4 9.5 15.9 7.8 
France 10.9 10.4 10.9 10.6 11.4 11.2 11.1 10.9 0.4 
Netherlands 10.8 9.5 7.9 14.4 11.2 14.4 8.8 11.0 2.6 
United Kingdom 9.0 10.9 9.8 9.4 9.9 11.6 8.5 9.9 1.1 
Italy 9.0 9.9 9.7 8.9 9.9 9.9 8.6 9.4 0.6 
Austria 8.0 8.0 7.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.9 0.2 
Slovenia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 
Ireland 1.9 1.9 2.4 1.9 2.8 2.2 2.6 2.2 0.4 
Belgium 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 
Greece 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.5 0.3 
Poland 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean  8.9 9.2 8.1 10.8 9.3 10.9 7.8  
Std. dev. 6.9 7.3 5.9 9.7 7.1 9.3 5.5   
There are some interesting effects concerning the industry averages and the R&D intensity 
measured as R&D expenditures in % of turnover. On average, tax subsidies in the food sector 
and in the metal sector are highest with 11%. However, as can be seen from Table 4, these 
two sectors display by far the lowest R&D intensity. The table also lists the firm’s profit (net 
of taxes) in period 6 and compares with the R&D expenditures. The industries with lowest 
average tax subsidies are motor vehicle sector and electric albeit they showh the highest R&D 
intensities of the considered industries. The food and the metal sectors spend 41% and 29% of 
their profits in R&D activities. The electric and motor vehicle sectors have R&D expenditures 
which are three times their annual profits. 
Table 4:  Selected economic parameters of the considered firms (period 6). 
  Bench-mark firm Chemicals Electric Food 
Mech. 
enginee-
ring 
Metal Motor vehicle 
R&D intensity  
in % of turnover 4.5% 4.6% 7.6% 0.7% 4.0% 0.8% 6.1% 
R&D expenditures 
in 1,000 € 363 453 703 64 331 75 542 
Profit in 1,000 € 214 288 236 155 209 261 184 
R&D expend. / profit 1.70 1.57 2.98 0.41 1.59 0.29 2.95 
Note: Details are given in Table 9. 
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Given these high amounts of R&D expenditures it becomes evident that firms in the electric 
and motor vehicle sector cannot always make use of the whole tax incentives in the same pe-
riod the expenditures arise, since the taxable bases or the tax due are too low. In tendency, this 
is rather not the case for the two industries with low R&D intensity. Thus, profitability in 
combination with the amount of R&D expenditures plays an important role for the effect of 
R&D tax incentives. 
The need for sufficient profits clearly can be seen in the results for Spain and Hungary. There, 
the tax subsidy is around 30% for the food and metal sector while it is considerably lower for 
sectors with higher R&D intensities. In Spain, the limitation that the R&D incentive may re-
duce the tax due by 50% at the maximum is responsible for this result. This result is interest-
ing as one would expect that the Spanish incentive is significantly better than the Portuguese 
one. In Hungary, the necessary corporate tax base itself is considerably low since business tax 
is deductible twice from the corporate taxable base. The business tax thus limits the effect of 
the Hungarian extra deduction. In other words, the effects in the two countries show that gov-
ernments should choose the level of a tax incentive in accordance with the framing general tax 
system. If the incentive is too high relative to the general taxation (e.g. Hungary) or if the in-
centive is too high compared to the corporate income tax (e.g. Spain), firms with high R&D 
intensities, in particular, are not able to profit from the incentive and different and unequal 
impacts across a sample of firms can occur. Malta in contrast displays a quite stable effect 
across all model firms, as the share of other taxes is zero in Malta. That improves the prob-
ability at a given profitability that the full tax incentive (extra deduction) can be used in the 
respective period as no deductions for other taxes lower the corporate tax base. 
There are several countries which account for these problems. Austria, the United Kingdom 
(and the Netherlands in case of payroll taxes) give cash refunds if the incentive cannot be 
used completely in the respective period. As can be seen from Table 3, there is only little var-
iation between the considered industries. However, in the United Kingdom the cash refund is 
less generous (24% of un-useable R&D deductions) than the Austrian one.  
Concluding, the comparison of several industries clearly shows that a firm’s profitability has a 
considerable impact on the R&D incentive’s effect. This is counterproductive since the incen-
tive is meant to support R&D expenditures of firms which do not have enough liquidity to 
undertake R&D on their own. One of the important arguments which support the use of tax 
incentives is the intention not to distort the decision of the firms concerning the composition 
of its R&D. A tax incentive that has (strongly) different effects depending on the profitability 
of a firm causes different incentive effects and thus distortion depending on firm and industry 
specific parameters and economic cycle. A way to solve this problem is the Austrian or Brit-
ish way where non-useable incentives can be refunded by cash so that liquidity is guaranteed 
in the period it is needed. 
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3.2.2 Varying R&D Expenditures 
How does distribution of R&D expenditures over time influence the incentive’s efficiency? 
To find out we measure the effect on the tax burden with constant R&D expenditures over 
time in a first step and with highly increasing expenditures over time in a second step. We 
thus simulate two extreme distributions of R&D expenditures over time. 
For the first simulation we assume €361K R&D expenditures over all periods. Table 5 dis-
plays the results. The found effects are almost the same for those countries which solely grant 
volume-based incentives. But we find significant decreases of the tax subsidies for those 
countries which offer (parts) of their R&D incentive on the increment. These effects are 
strong enough to change the ranking of the impact for Portugal and Spain as well as for Ire-
land and Greece. Ireland and Greece, as they both solely offer incremental incentives, rank 
last. However, only Greece shows a tax subsidy of zero. For Ireland, there is still a positive 
subsidy because the incentive is also given on capital expenditures for R&D buildings. The 
decreases of tax subsidies are less pronounced in Spain and Portugal, since they offer both a 
volume-based and an incremental incentive. 
Table 5: Tax subsidies in % in case of constant R&D expenditures  
Country Benchmark firm
Spain 20.0 
Portugal 19.8 
Czech Republik 18.1 
Malta 12.7 
Hungary 12.3 
Netherlands 11.2 
France 9.9 
Italy 9.1 
United Kingdom 8.9 
Austria 8.0 
Slovenia 5.0 
Belgium 1.6 
Poland 0.8 
Ireland 0.3 
Greece 0.0 
Finland 0.0 
Mean 
Std. dev. 
8.6 
6.9 
 
In the second simulation, the R&D expenditures are set to zero in the first period. We assume 
an R&D intensity of 4.5% for periods 2 to 10 (like in the standard case, please see table 4, 
first row for the R&D intensities of the other model firms). Consequently, we expect that 
countries with generous incremental incentives show high tax subsidies since the increase in 
R&D expenditures is 100% in the second period. 
The average tax subsidy for Portugal increases from approx. 20.3% to 23.6%, Spain changes 
its ranking position with the Czech Republic and is now second with 20.8%, France shows an 
enormous increase which results in a rank on the fourth position and Ireland is now on the 
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fifth position, followed by Malta and Hungary. The most important parameter for the dis-
played changes in the ranking of tax subsidies is the rate of the incentive. Spain and Portugal 
have a rate of 50%, France of 40% and Ireland of 20% on the increment.14 This sensitivity 
analysis reveals a strong impact of the development of R&D over time which can change the 
ranking of the best locations from an investors view. The decision to choose a location and to 
conduct R&D needs a detailed look on the probable future development of the company’s 
R&D activity. If a strong increase of the R&D activity is expected, it can make sense to turn 
to countries with a beneficial way to calculate the base (fixed base) for the R&D increase like 
Ireland. The effect for Ireland is as strong because the increment is calculated with reference 
to the year 2003. That means that an increase in the second year not only increases the base 
for the incentive in the next two periods (like it would be the case for the rolling two year av-
erage method) but also in all other periods. This simulation reflects an upper limit of the in-
centive for a company that is about to begin R&D activity (e.g. for the first time). 
Table 6: Tax subsidies in % per industry in case of R&D expenditures with industry specific R&D in-
tensity in periods 2 to 10 but zero in period one 
Country 
Bench-
mark 
firm 
Chemi-
cals Electric Food 
Mech. 
enginee-
ring 
Metal Motor vehicle 
Mean 
(6 ind.) 
Std. 
Var. 
Portugal 24.6 25.7 17.9 26.6 26.3 26.7 17.3 23.6 4.2 
Spain 17.8 20.0 14.2 30.1 19.5 30.2 14.0 20.8 6.8 
Czech Republik 16.2 16.5 14.1 16.5 16.6 16.6 13.1 15.7 1.4 
France 15.3 14.9 15.2 15.2 15.7 15.6 15.1 15.3 0.3 
Ireland 12.1 13.3 10.7 15.7 12.5 16.4 10.1 13.0 2.4 
Malta 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.4 0.1 
Hungary 10.7 13.3 8.9 26.5 11.5 23.9 8.4 14.7 7.4 
Netherlands 10.0 8.9 7.4 14.0 10.4 14.0 8.2 10.4 2.7 
Italy 8.1 9.1 8.9 8.1 9.1 9.1 7.8 8.6 0.6 
United Kingdom 7.4 9.3 8.2 7.7 8.4 10.0 7.4 8.3 1.0 
Austria 7.2 7.2 6.8 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 0.2 
Greece 4.7 5.9 5.8 8.1 8.2 8.2 4.3 6.5 1.7 
Slovenia 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 0.0 
Belgium 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.0 
Poland 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.0 
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mean  9.5 10.1 8.5 12.1 10.2 12.2 8.2  
Std. dev. 6.7 7.1 5.3 9.4 7.1 9.1 5.2   
Overall, the simulations show that R&D tax incentives in general do have a considerable im-
pact on a firm’s tax burden. But they also show that the design of an R&D incentive must be 
in accordance with the overall tax system it is embedded in. Given the background that the 
incentive is meant to increase liquidity it is necessary to grant immediate cash refund in case 
the incentive is not useable since profits or tax payments are too small. 
                                                 
14  Other countries that do not have an incentive on the increase of expenditures over time show, as expected, 
slightly lower impacts because the R&D expenditures in period one are lost for their incentives. 
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4 Comparison to B-Index 
Section 2 gave a brief discussion to what extent the methodological approaches of measuring 
the impact of R&D tax incentives by means of the B-Index and by means of the European Tax 
Analyzer differ. The following Table 7 compares the tax subsidies determined by both ap-
proaches for the EU27. Considering first the rankings in the last two columns it turns out that 
there are only few differences. There is a considerable difference for Italy because in the 
simulations we take the 2007 situation into account whereas all other data is based on 2006. 
Similar is true for Denmark.15 The other countries more or less show a similar position in the 
ranking. 
Table 7:  Comparison of tax subsidies determined by means of the European Tax Analyzer and the B-
Index, in %, 2006. 
Tax subsidy in % Ranking 
European Tax Analyzer (1 – B-Index) European Tax Analyzer B-Index 
Portugal 21.1 28.5 1 2 
Spain 20.1 39.1 2 1 
Czech Republic 18.2 27.1 3 3 
Malta 12.8 n/a 4 
Hungary 11.7 16.2 5 6 
France 10.9 18.9 6 5 
Netherlands 10.8 23.9 7 4 
United Kingdom 9.0 10.6 9 8 
Italy 9.0 -2.3 8 18 
Austria 8.0 8.8 10 10 
Slovenia 5.0 n/a 11 
Ireland 1.9 4.9 12 11 
Belgium 1.5 8.9 13 9 
Greece 1.3 -1.1 14 15 
Poland 0.8 2.2 15 12 
Finland 0.0 -0.8 16 13 
Bulgaria 0.0 n/a 17 
Cyprus 0.0 n/a 17 
Denmark 0.0 16.1 17 7 
Estonia 0.0 n/a 17 
Germany 0.0 -3.0 17 19 
Latvia 0.0 n/a 17 
Lithuania 0.0 n/a 17 
Luxembourg 0.0 -1.4 17 16 
Romania 0.0 n/a 17  
Slovakia 0.0 -0.8 17 13 
Sweden 0.0 -1.5 17 17 
Note: The B-Index is shown as (1 – B-Index) x 100. The table lists the B-Index for small firms. The OECD data 
shows the Italian 2006 value while our simulation consider the introduced rules in 2007. 
Source: OECD (2007), own calculations. 
However, the level of tax subsidies is not similar for all countries. There are two main reasons 
why the tax subsidies determined by means of the European Tax Analyzer differ from the B-
Index.  
                                                 
15 Denmark offers an extra deduction of 50% for R&D expenditures which occur for projects undertaken from 
private firms together with public institutions. This incentive, however, is not considered in our simulation. 
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The European Tax Analyzer takes into account limitations such as maximum ceilings up to 
which the incentive can be applied. A prominent example for this is Spain which has the 
highest tax subsidy in the B-Index ranking, but only the second highest in our simulations. 
The 50% maximum reduction of the corporate tax due in Spain is not considered for in the B-
Index. As can be seen from the simulations with the European Tax Analyzer, firms easily 
reach this ceiling, so that the tax subsidy is much lower for the European Tax Analyzer than 
for the B-Index. The differences are much less distinct in Portugal where no such limitations 
exist. The same is true for carry forwards of unused tax incentives. In case of Austria and the 
United Kingdom, where immediate cash refunds are granted, the tax subsidies of B-Index and 
European Tax Analyzer are close together. 
A more technical reason is that we compare the situations with and without having a tax in-
centive while the B-Index compares the taxation of R&D expenditures with general taxation. 
E.g. in case of investments in fixed depreciable assets, the B-Index exceeds 1 (i.e. the tax sub-
sidy is negative) if there is no tax incentive in place in the country considered (see Germany, 
Italy 2006, Slovakia, Sweden). The tax subsidy determined with the European Tax Analyzer 
is zero because it is assumed that the investment nevertheless is undertaken. Moreover, the 
composition of R&D expenditures differs. 
Altogether, the comparison shows that both methodologies more or less come to the same 
ranking of countries. However, since the European Tax Analyzer can account for much more 
parameters which have an impact on the R&D tax incentive’s efficiency, the level of deter-
mined tax subsidies differs in some countries. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of R&D tax incentives on the effective corporate tax 
burden. Our calculations are based on the simulation model European Tax Analyzer which 
determines the tax burden of a firm over a certain period of time. It was thus possible to re-
ceive additional information on the impact of R&D tax incentives that go beyond the com-
monly used simple model of the B-Index. 
The results showed that R&D tax incentives in the EU-27 member states have a significant 
impact on the effective corporate tax burden. Countries with highest tax subsidies are Portu-
gal, Spain, and the Czech Republic. The level of tax subsidies does not so much depend on 
the kind of incentive but rather on its design. Portugal and Spain grant high rates of tax cred-
its, the Czech Republic applies a generous extra-allowance for R&D expenditures. Only in 
case of progressive tax rates, the kind of incentive has an impact on the tax subsidy’s volume 
as the progressive corporate income tax in the United Kingdom shows. 
We analysed the impact of certain design parameters of R&D incentives and the framing tax 
regimes on the effective tax burden and the resulting tax subsidies. Taking e.g. Spain and 
Hungary, where the granted tax incentives often cannot be used in the period in which expen-
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ditures have taken place, it became evident that the design of the tax incentive must be in ac-
cordance with the framing tax system in order to be efficient. An immediate cash refund for 
unused tax incentives is found to be a good solution of this problem. In Austria and the United 
Kingdom, where cash refunds are in place, the tax subsidies do not depend as much on a 
firm’s profitability as in Spain or in Hungary. The most important drivers of tax subsidies 
turned out to be the design of the incentive itself, its fitting to the general tax system, and the 
firm’s profitability relative to the level of R&D expenditures. 
Our simulation results are more or less similar to those of the B-Index, in what concerns the 
ranking of countries. However, since the European Tax Analyzer accounts for much more 
specifications of the incentive, the framing tax system, and the firm there are several differ-
ences with respect to the level of tax subsidies. In particular, there are differences for coun-
tries with limited tax incentives. 
References 
Atkinson, R.D. (2007), Expanding the R&D tax credit to drive innovation, competitiveness 
and prosperity, Journal of Technology Transfer (32), 617-628. 
Billings, A.B. (2003), Are US tax incentives for corporate R&D likely to motivate American 
firms to perform research abroad?, Tax Executive 55 (4), 291-315. 
Bloom, N., Griffith, R. (2001), The Internationalisation of UK R&D, Fiscal Studies 22 (3), 
337-355. 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2003), Verhältniszahlen aus Jahresabschlüssen deutscher Unterneh-
men von 1998 bis 2000, Statistische Sonderveröffentlichung 6, Frankfurt/Main. 
Griffith, R., S. Redding, and J. Van Reenen (2001), Measuring the Cost-Effectiveness of an 
R&D Tax Credit for the UK, Fiscal Studies 22 (3), 375-399. 
Gutekunst, G. (2005), Steuerbelastungen und Steuerwirkungen bei nationaler und grenzüber-
schreitender Geschäftstätigkeit, Lohmar. 
Hall, B.H. (2002), The Financing of Research and Development, NBER Working Paper 8773. 
Hall, R.E., and D. Jorgenson (1967), Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, American Econom-
ic Review 57, 391-414. 
Hermann, R.A. (2006), Die Besteuerung von Personengesellschaften in den EU-Mitgliedstaa-
ten und den USA, Lohmar. 
IBFD (2006), Corporate Taxation in Europe, Amsterdam. 
Jacobs, O.H. and C. Spengel (1996), European Tax Analyzer, Baden-Baden. 
Jacobs, O.H., C. Spengel, T. Stetter, and C. Wendt (2005), EU Company Taxation in Case of 
a Common Tax Base, Intertax 33, 414-428. 
King, M.A. and D. Fullerton (1984), The Taxation of Income from Capital, Chicago. 
Lammersen, L. (2005), Steuerbelastungsvergleiche, Wiesbaden. 
 20 
McFetridge, D.G. and J.P. Warda (1983), Canadian R&D Incentives: Their Adequacy and 
Impact, Toronto. 
McKenzie, K.J. (2008), Measuring Tax Incentives for R&D, International Tax and Public 
Finance 15, 563-581. 
Meyer, R. (1996), Computergestützte Simulation von Steuerbelastungen, Baden-Baden. 
OECD (2002), Frascati Manual 2002, Paris. 
OECD (2006), Science, Technology and industry Outlook 2006, Paris. 
Paff, L. (2005), State-level R&D tax credits: A firm-level analysis, Topics in Economic Anal-
ysis and Policy 5(1), 1272. 
Spengel, C. (1995), Europäische Steuerbelastungsvergleiche, Düsseldorf. 
Spengel, C., D. Endres, D. Harhoff, F. Heinemann, M. Hellwig, M. Hüther, C. Regierer, W. 
Schön and K. Stein (2008), Steuerliche Förderung von Investitionen in Forschung und 
Entwicklung (FuE) in Deutschland – ökonomische Begründung, Handlungsbedarf und 
Reformoptionen, Heidelberg. 
Stifterverband (2007), FuE-Datenreport 2007 – Tabellen und Daten, Essen. 
Tassey (2007a), The Technology Imperative, London. 
Tassey (2007b), Tax Incentives for Innovation: Time to Restructure the R&E Tax Credit, 
Journal of Technological Transfer 32, 605-615. 
Warda, J. (1996), Measuring the Value of R&D Tax Provisions, in: OECD, Fiscal Measures 
to Promote R&D and Innovation, OECD (96)165, Paris, 9-22. 
Warda, J. (2001), Measuring the Value of R&D Tax Treatment in OECD Countries, Special 
Issue on New Science and Technology Indicators, STI Review No. 27, OECD. 
Warda, J. (2006), Tax Treatment of Business Investments in Intellectual Assets: an Interna-
tional Comparison, STI Working Paper DSTI/DOC (2006)4, Paris. 
Wilson, D.J. (2007), Beggar thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State and Aggregate Effects 
of R&D Tax Credits, FRBSF Working Papers Series. 
 ANNEX 
Table 8: Implemented R&D tax incentives 
  Expenditures  
for personnel 
Other current  
expenditures 
Capital  
expenditures 
Carry forward 
possible? 
Tax deferral 
 BE   accel. dep.  
 FI   accel. dep. buildings  
 GR   accel dep.  
 UK   full depreciation if no 
real estate 
 
Reduction of tax base 
Volume BE - - extra dep 13.5% no limit 
 CZ 200% 200% - 3 years 
 HU 200% 200% 200% no limit 
 MT 150% 150% - no limit 
 PL - - extra dep. 50% Tech 3 years 
 SL 120% 120% 120% 5 years 
 UK 150% 150%  cash refund 
Increment AT 135% 135%   
 GR 150% 150%   
Reduction of tax due 
Volume AT 8% 8% 8% cash refund 
 BE 25%/50% qual. R&D-
personnel 
 
-  cash refund 
 ES 30%+20% max. 50% 
CIT 
30% max. 50% CIT 10% max. 50% CIT 15 years 
 FR 10% max €10m 10% max €10m 10% (no real est) no limit 
 HU 10%   4 years 
 IT 10% max. €15m 10% max. €15m  forbidden 
 IR   20% (real estate)  
 NL 42% (110.000)/14%   cash refund 
 PT 20% 20% 20% 6 years 
Increment ES 50% 50%   
 FR 40% 40% 40%  
 IR 20%, Base 2003 20%, Base 2003 20%, Base 2003, no real 
estate 
 
 PT 50% max. €750K 50% max. €750K 50% max. €750K  
Source: IBFD and own research. 
  
Table 9:  Financial ratios of benchmark case and model firm (period 6)  
 
 Benchmark case Chemicals Electric Food 
Net profit (€) 214,146 287,839 235,819 155,405 
Balance-sheet total (€) 5,995,166 6,771,834 6,321,627 5,533,259 
Turnover (€) 8,073,092 9,840,934 9,249,152 9,082,228 
Share of fixed assets 27.73% 31.97% 17.39% 31.11% 
Return on sales 2.65% 2.92% 2.55% 1.71% 
Return on equity 19.37% 16.90% 15.26% 15.66% 
Equity ratio 22.02% 29.40% 28.18% 20.75% 
Return on assets 7.70% 7.47% 6.65% 7.62% 
Inventories  
to total capital 25.90% 21.75% 29.54% 18.81% 
Costs for personnel 
to turnover 29.71% 22.97% 27.65% 17.46% 
R&D expenditures to turnover 4.50% 4.60% 7.60% 0.70% 
     
  Mechanical  engineering Metal Motor vehicle 
Net profit (€)  208,864 261,194 183,776 
Balance-sheet total (€)  6,189,490 6,027,552 5,528,685 
Turnover (€)  8,285,232 9,431,545 8,887,880 
Share of fixed assets  18.69% 28.93% 25.98% 
Return on sales  2.52% 2.77% 2.07% 
Return on equity  17.71% 22.97% 21.68% 
Equity ratio  22.43% 23.20% 18.66% 
Return on assets  6.25% 8.51% 6.28% 
Inventories  
to total capital  31.96% 24.69% 24.03% 
Costs for personnel 
to turnover  32.91% 25.65% 27.23% 
R&D Expenditures to turnover  4.00% 0.80% 6.10% 
 
Detailed Description of the European Tax Analyzer Model 
The European Tax Analyzer is a computer program for a model firm that calculates and com-
pares effective average tax burdens for companies located in different jurisdictions.16 The cur-
rent version covers the tax systems of 27 EU member states. Since the standard model firm is 
designed as a (limited) corporation, the effective average tax burden can be calculated at the 
level of the corporation as well as at the level of the shareholders. This study exclusively con-
siders the effective average tax burden at the corporation level. The effective average tax bur-
den is derived by simulating the development of a corporation over a ten year period. For the 
computation of the effective average tax burden the model uses the economic data of the cor-
poration and tax data as inputs.  
                                                 
16  For detailed descriptions of the model see Spengel, 1995; Jacobs and Spengel, 1996; Meyer, 1996; Stetter, 
2005; Gutekunst, 2005, Hermann, 2006. 
  
The following description therefore highlights the basic assumptions and the most recent 
amendments of this approach. The European Tax Analyzer calculates and compares effective 
average tax burdens for companies over a period of ten years. The development of the corpo-
ration is based on the initial capital stock and the estimates for its future development (further 
called corporate planning). 
Initial capital stock: The capital stock includes the firm’s total assets and liabilities which are 
either new or have already existed before. The assets consist of real estate, office and factory 
buildings, plant and machinery, office equipment, intangibles (patents and royalties), financial 
assets, shares in other corporations (both domestic and foreign), inventories, trade debtors, 
cash funds, and deposits. The liabilities include new equity capital, long-term and short-term 
debt, and trade creditors. 
Development of capital stock: Corporate planning supplies data about the expected develop-
ment of the capital stock over the simulation period of ten years. Estimates are based on peri-
odical assumptions for production and sales, acquisition of goods, staff expenditure (e.g. 
number of employees, wage per employee and pension costs), other receipts and expenses 
(e.g. expenses for R&D), investment, distribution, and costs of financing. Goods are assumed 
to be either stocked or sold on the market in the same period as they are produced. Therefore, 
multi-period production is possible. Additional assumptions are made for material and labour 
with regard to production costs. It is further assumed that depreciable assets (i.e. buildings, 
plant and machinery, office equipment, and intangibles) are run down at the end of their ex-
pected economic life. Reinvestments in new assets are made at that point based on the histori-
cal costs of the deposited assets adjusted for inflation. The model’s assumptions regarding 
investment make sure that the initial capital stock at least remains constant. In addition to dif-
fering rates of price increases, other macro-economic data considered are credit and debit in-
terest rates, exchange rates for the given countries and the costs of energy and electricity. 
Corporate finance: The initial capital stock contains new equity as well as both long and short 
term debt capital. Since the corporate plans, inter alia, make assumptions about the distribu-
tion policy, the company can be financed by retained earnings (e.g. the distribution rate is be-
low 100%) in addition to new equity and debt financing. If the national tax codes allow for 
internal book reserves (e.g. book reserves for bad debts), the money put into these reserves 
can also serve as a source of internal financing. 
For the sake of comparability, it is assumed that the model firm always shows identical data 
before any taxation. Due to this necessary assumption any differences between pre- and post-
tax data in the model can be solely attributed to the applied national taxation rules.  
Computation of the Effective Average Tax Burden 
The measures for tax base and for tax burden are expressed in currency units (€). The effec-
tive tax burden is the difference between the pre-tax and the post-tax value of the firm at the 
  
end of the simulation period (i.e. period 10). The value of the firm represents the equity, 
which includes the capital stock and the cumulative net income of each of the ten periods. At 
the end of period ten, the tax value of assets and liabilities may differ from their fair value, 
depending on the tax rules which are to be applied. These hidden reserves and liabilities are 
added to the taxable income in period ten and are taxed accordingly. As a consequence, only 
the effects of different tax accounting rules on the liquidity are taken into account. Remaining 
loss carry forwards at the end of the simulation are dissolved liquidity-related whereas a de-
valuation of 50 per cent is made if there are no restrictions for the use of loss carry forwards 
and a devaluation of 75 per cent if there are any restrictions. The computation of the absolute 
effective average tax burden requires two steps. 
In the first step, the pre-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period is calculated. 
The pre-tax value of the firm is derived from the estimated cash flows and the value of the net 
assets at the end of the simulation period. The cash flows are derived from estimates for the 
cash receipts (sales and other receipts, gains upon the disposal of assets, interest and dividend 
income) and expenses (wages and pension payments, expenses for material, energy consump-
tion and other expenses, new investment, interest expenses and distributed profits) included in 
the corporate planning. The cash flow (= liquidity) is calculated in each period. Thereby it is 
assumed that any given amount of surplus cash flow at the end of a single period can be in-
vested at a given interest rate and any given deficit can be covered by borrowing money at a 
given debit rate (balancing investment or credit). The interest receipts or expenses plus the 
amount of the underlying balancing investments or credits are considered for the calculation 
of the cash flow in the following period. The value of the net assets at the end of the simula-
tion period is computed by deducting the liabilities of the corporation from the assets. Both 
the assets and the liabilities are valued at calibrated parameters that are the same in each coun-
try. For assets we use replacement prices and for liabilities nominal values. 
Pre-tax cash flow at the end of the simulation period 
+ Value of the net assets at the end of the simulation period  
      (= assets in the capital stock at replacement prices  
– liabilities in the capital stock at nominal values) 
= Pre-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period  
In the second step, we calculate the post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation pe-
riod. The determination of the post-tax value of the firm only has cash flow effects and no 
impact on the value of the net assets. The post-tax cash flow is derived in each period by de-
ducting the tax liabilities from the pre-tax cash flow. In order to calculate the absolute amount 
of tax liabilities, receipts and expenses enter into the tax balance sheet and/ or into the tax 
profit and loss account following national taxation rules (e.g. regarding the computation of 
depreciation allowances). After having applied the national tax rates, we allow for other rele-
vant components such as loss carryovers and tax credits in order to come to the amount of tax 
liabilities. The reduction of the cash flow due to tax payments (liabilities) also has an impact 
on the balancing investment or credit and the connected interest receipts or credits. By taking 
  
into account these tax-induced effects on the interest income or expense of each period, the 
deferral of tax payments is integrated into the model. Hidden reserves and liabilities are only 
relevant for taxation matters at the very end of the simulation. 
 Pre-tax cash flow at the end of the simulation period  
- Tax liabilities in each period 
= Post-tax cash flow at the end of the simulation period  
+ Value of the net assets at the end of the simulation period  
 (= assets in the capital stock at replacement prices 
–  liabilities in the capital stock at nominal values) 
- /+ Tax liabilities on hidden reserves / tax refunds on hidden liabilities    
= Post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period  
 Pre-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period  
- Post-tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period 
= Effective average tax burden 
In contrast to models which compute tax burdens solely based on pre-tax returns (yields), cal-
culations based on cash receipts and cash expenses regarding balancing investments allow for 
the entire computation of all tax bases at any time during the period of simulation (because all 
relevant income and assets have been entered into the tax base). As a consequence, the model 
can include complicated tax provisions such as progressive tax rates, tax credits (e.g. for for-
eign taxes) with upper ceilings, and loss carryovers without any difficulty. 
Tax Parameters Incorporated into the Model 
The tax base and the effective average tax burden are calculated for the EU-27 member states. 
In order to calculate the tax liability in each country the European Tax Analyzer takes into 
account all taxes that may be influenced by the investments and financing at the level of the 
corporation. A detailed description of the tax parameters is not given here. When calculating 
the tax bases, the most relevant assets and liabilities and the effects of the corporate planning 
are considered. Finally, referring to the tax rates, the calculations consider statutory linear as 
well as progressive tax rate structures. In the case of progressive rates – relevant for special 
provisions for SMEs in some countries - the tax rates enter into the model as functions of the 
relevant income or net assets (non-profit taxes) according to the tax laws. 
